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PART ONE : PLURAL POLICY ARENAS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
C .  Wright Mills (1959) argued that "there is no longer , 
on the one hand , an economy, and , on the other , a political order 
containing a military establishment unimportant to politics and to 
money making . There is a political economy numerously linked with 
military order and decision. The triangle of power is now a 
structural fact , and it is the key to any understanding of the 
Mgher circles· in America toJay.11 The emphasis, quitB obviously, 
of this approach was on the monolithic nature of the power elite , 
and the absence of any countervailing powers. 
The most important contribution of the pluralist school , 
in my opinion, was the demonstration that policy making seems to 
be done in multiple policy arenas rather than a single monolithic 
one. As Dahl, Polsby, and Wolfinger demonstrated for New Raven,
education policy is different from redevelopment policy , and 
both are different from party nominations . The individuals who 
are·influential in one policy· arena may not be influential in 
another . Policy decisions made in each policy arena are made 
Interest groups play a central role in a system If plural policy arenas , and have been closely associated with the 
term pluralism in all its various manifestations , from BeJtl�y 
to the much more sophisticated New Haven brand of pluralisL . 
Individ=1" become "acdve poli<ieally no< from a aml o, di"Y 
nor out of a sustained interest in politics but only blcause 
primary goals at the focus of their lives were endangef ed , and 
political action was thought to be the only way to ward onlf 
. I danger" (Dahl 1961 , p .  197) . When they become so involved , 
he 
<hey di•cover <ha< <hey ha� influence re•o�cee <ha< lhe1 .. y 
have never before bothered to use . "Virtually no one , l and 
certainly no group of more than a few individuals ,  is $ntJrety 
lacking is some influence resources" (1961, p .  228). 
Grours of, individuals ' thus 1111bilized! do not hav� to 
2 
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Thus , we find the teachers' unions were vitally invol,ed inlNew 
Haven ' •  educa<io=l poli<ic• , �d bu•ine•e group• in ,ede�lopmen 
but neither group had to influence the outcome in some othe are� 
to be made happy . This is different from pluralism aJ 11glo p in� 
action" autonomy. 
one This fragmentation of the policy-making process i
�'' widely recogniaed con<rihu<ion• of <he N� elve 
pluralist school . As Crenson perceived it , the position lwar tha1 
power "cannot be centralized within some small ruling class whi� . _J_J __ -· J 
of the 
peak of a unified political hierarchy . Instead , community power 
will be scattered across a spectrum of local leaders and groups , 
each capable . of exercising influence in only one or a few issue-
areas" (1971 , p .  20) . In his recent critique of Dahl ' s  study , 
Domhoff (1978) argues that business leaders were much more re-
sponsible for redevelopment in New Haven than Dahl recognized ; 
however, he is never able to seriously challenge Dahl ' s  argument 
that policy making was nevertheless fragmented � policy 
arenas , no matter how elitist within the redevelopment arena . 
Furthermore, Polsby explicitly argues that this 
multiplicity of policy arenas holds true for more cities than 
New Haven. "The finding that participants in decision-making 
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are largely specialized to certain issue-areas has been confirmed 
by data gathered using both the methods prevalent in community­
power research" (1963, p .  124) . 
that : 
In New York City , for instance, Sayre and Kaufman find 
Functionally specialized officials constitute the core 
groups for decisions in particular functional areas of 
governmental action, whether these are in line agencies , 
in special authorities , • • •  or in overhead agencies • •
Each of these decision centers is surrounded by satellite 
groups especially concerned with its decisions -- the leaders 
of the interests served , the interests regulated , professional 
societies and associations , organized bureaucracies , labor 
unions , suppliers of revenues and materials and others . 
Usually , the groups concerned chiefly with particular functions 
are uninterested in decisions in other, unrelated functional 
areas , so that most of the decisions (about appointmetits i as 
well as programs and policies) in each decision ceAte�ll ate 
worked out by an interplay among the specialized cJre an
its satellite groups . [1960 , p .  711] 
The autonomy of these policy arenas is suggested in Lowi ' s  lobk 
by his use of the term "functional feudalities" (1964 , t 215 
What Dahl , Polsby, and Wolfinger have demonsttatJd or 
4 ! 
I New Haven and local politics , others have demonstrated for [nationa[ 
politics . Seidman (1970) , for instance , pointed out thl inte actill
between interest groups and the relevant nexus of congrlssJonhl 
I I committee and bureaucratic agency, and denoted that kind 0£ ihter-
action by the term "policy subgovernment . "  While the t�reJ-w{ly 
I I interaction of defense contractors , armed services committees 
Defense Department may be unstoppable with respect to wlapdns 
acquisition policy, Seidman argues that there are other l tr�an 
and 
ular 
interactions with respect to flood control and navigation, lagti­
cultural policy, irrigation policy , welfare policy, edu1at�on 
policy , nuclear energy , etc . The most interesting poinb aJou 
policy making, according to Seidman , is the extent to w�icJ these 
decentralized policy arenas operate independently of ealh dther . 
While there is indeed a military-industrial complex, as deJcrabed 
by C .  Wright Mills , it is not at the apex of all policy maJink in 
the United States -- it is at the apex of one policy arena lout of 
many. In order to explain farm price-support policy, ybu do hot 
need to understand the evil military-industrial complex ydu pnly 
need to understand the evil agribusiness-Department of lgrJcqllture1 
complex . 
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But accepting the basic pluralist description of 
multiple, decentralized policy arenas , responsive to different 
groups of intensely interested people , are we led to the pluralist 
prescription that such a decentralized policy system is good? 
Is it the case, for instance , that the open, pluralist system 
provides so many points of access , so many modes of effective 
participation that any group will be represented effectively if 
it tries long enough and hard enough? Does the presence of 
plural policy arenas imply the overthrow of class-based explana-
tions of politics and policy? Furthermore, does the existence of 
multiple centers of power result in a pattern of policy making 
that is balanced , and somehow best for all overall? 
I believe that the· public choice literature,  which has 
developed rapidly in the eighteen years since Dahl wrote Who 
Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (1961) , allows 
us to say a great deal about the benefits of pluralism described 
in that and succeeding pluralist works . I will attempt to sum-
marize some of what the public choice literature can say about 
pluralism in the rest of Part I ,  under the headings of Pluralism 
and Representation.and Pluralism and Efficiency. 
Pluralism and Representation 
Mancur Olson wrote a critique of classical pluralist 
thinking in The Logic of Collective Action (1965 ) . His position was 
basically that the classical pluralists (Bentley , Truman) � 
that organizations will form if and when there is a group of 
people who would greatly benefit . His public choice critique of 
ld 
pluralism was that the shared benefits of forming an interes 
group do not result in spontaneous generation of that ilteieat 
group because of the free rider problem. Each individull to 
be better off if the costs of organization were overcoml ; �u
everyone has a dominant strategy not to voluntarily donlte l t  
overcome these costs . 
This critique of pluralism is fairly clear , yet it lis 
perhaps worthwhile , at a conference session on public choile �nd 
pluralism, to notice two things : (1) that later plurallstl sleem 
to be subj ect to the same criticism and (2) that this ckitlcilsm 
makes possible a reconciliation of pluralism with class�bale 
theories of politics . 
I  Dahl directly linked the fragmentation of the! polic! 
 system to a supposed representativeness of that system 1- •rth! independence ,  penetrability, and heterogeneity of the various 
segments of the political stratum all but guarantee thak aJy
. 
dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the political l stjatl.im" 
(1961, p .  4) . The expression of political dissatisfaction l inl the 
proper "independent" political arena requires few resouices , and 
"virtually no one , and certainly no group of· more than l fJw
individuals ,  is entirely lacking in some influence resolrcJs11 
(p . 228) . Yet Dahl observes , also , that there seems to l beia 
large "variation in resource use . "  The variation in usage l of 
resources is due to such things as "political confidenc� , " l alter­
native opportunities for the use of one 1 s resources , an� ttle l're-
1 I ward" for using the resources . If these are the sources of 
6 
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variation, then one would expect that anyone will use his resources 
if the cause is important enough and he has the confidence to do 
so. As an example, he points to the families on Truman Street who 
objected to the metal houses in their neighborhood. All it took 
to get them involved and in the fight was enough of a reward-stimu-
lus and guts. 
But this surely is an example of the fallacy which 
concerns Olson. The primary source of variation in resource 
mobilization, according to the Olson critique, must be the extent 
to which the group is organized. Lacking political organization, 
individuals may be highly interested, highly self-confident, but 
still free riders. Once organized by means of selective incentives, 
membership interest and self-confidence are unnecessary; the organi-
zation will continue to generate resources to serve the group's 
interests (as articulated by the group's leadership). Thus, welfare 
mothers may be highly interested in welfare policy and highly self-
confident, but unwilling to spend time articulating their interest 
in the absence of effective organization -- without such organization 
the incentives to be a free rider are overwhelming. On the other 
hand, the average middle-class subscriber to National Wildlife may be·· 
very little committed to environmental protection and may be com-
pletely lacking in political self-confidence; nevertheless he is 
using his resources to fight for environmental protection through 
the National Wildlife Organization which mobilizes these resources 
through the selective incentive of the magazine. 
While overlooking the primary cause of variations in the 
8 
mobilization of political resources Dahl (1961) does tr
l 
tol e 
the variation in political participation which he notices var�es I I 
lain 
with income and social class. In his figure on page 292 , the 
variation in participation once again comes down to "poJitiba 
fidence." According to Dahl the "middle class" has it, !the 
con 
"working class" doesn't. An alternative explanation of lthel class 
basis of variation in political participation is suggested by 
Frohlioh and Opp�heimer (1978 ,  pp. 66-89) . Thia ia <hle � 
political entrepreneurs better to organize the sizeable resou 
of middle-class individuals, rather than to organize the smll 
resources of the working or nonworking poor. The reasoJ isl t 
there is more of a surplus for the entrepreneur in orgaJizing 
middle-class environmentalists into the National WildliJe olg 
zation, than in organizing welfare mothers or migrant wdrkels 
a national organization. 
The result is that while the multiple policy arenas 
�<ionally and lo�lly '�d eo repr••�' differ�' grou,a, rb 
are different middle-class and upper-class groups. As Scha
l
t 
says, "the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heajenl� 
sings with a strong upper-class accent" (1960 , p. 35) . Whaf 
tschneider calls the pressure system, composed of these mul
l
i 
policy arenas, is primarily representative of the upper
l 
antl 
class groups which are most profitably organized. While bubi 
groups are highly organized, Schattschneider notes, "onJy a l c 
trace of the fifteen million Negroes in the United StatJs [be 
to the National Association for the Advancement of Colojed �e 
ays 
ces 
er 
at 
the 
.ni-
into 
y 
II chneillller II horus 
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The notion that the pressure system is automatically representative 
of the whole community is a myth fostered by the universalizing 
tendency of modern group theories. Pressure politics is a selective 
process ill-designed to serve diffuse interests" (ibid.). 
Pluralism and Efficiency 
Dahl argued that "a modern Madison might argue that 
government should be designed to inhibit a relatively apathetic 
majority from cramming its policy down the throats of a relatively 
intense minority" (1956 , p. 90) . This would seem to be the fun-
damental aspect of inefficiency with normal majority rule demo-
cracy: the intense minority would be willing to pay the majority 
some portion of the value generated by the policy proposal it has 
in mind; but because it can't legally or democratically do so, the 
result is that the majority crams an inefficient policy down the 
throats of the minority. 
This is, of course, an historically recognized problem 
with the democratic voting system -- the ballot does not register 
intensity of preference: all votes count equally, whether cast by 
the intense or the apathetic voter. This is in marked contrast to 
the market system, where an individual's preference intensity is 
indicated by how much he is willing to pay for various items avail-
able in the market. As the market price ratio equilibrates to the 
ratio of each individual's marginal utility, efficiency is achieved. 
The inability of democratic processes to indicate this "willingness 
to pay" has been linked with the inefficiency of democratic, as 
1 
ck opposed to market, outcomes. For instance, Buchanan anq Tu�l 
have proposed that logrolling over multiple issues in allegls 
allows an indication of preference of intensity as legi�latbr 
trade a vote on one issue for a vote on another issue. [The� 
naturally hypothesized that this improved revelation of lpre�e intensity might improve the efficiency characteristics of cln 
ature 
uite 
ence 
raliz 
democratic voting processes (1962 , pp. 131-145) .
The pluralist solution to the problem of majonities 
or.mm>ing i�ffioien< aolu<io� d� <he throa<a of odno1i<i�alia 
decentralization rather than logrolling in a centralized legisla­
ture. The difference is that with logrolling there is J ne�dlto 
negotiate a majority coalition for a package of bills. With 
decentralized, autonomous policy arenas, decisions made in la�h 
autonomous arena do not need ratification by a majoritylof lcaors 
across all policy arenas. However, pluralist decentralizatlo
has something of the same flavor of Buchanan and TullocJ's 
logrolling solution in that it too relies on improved rJvelation 
of preference intensity for efficiency gains. IndividuJls �e
involved in politics because they are intensely interesjed �nla 
few, particular policies; individuals reveal their prefJrenbe
intensity by mobilizing their scarce resources in the aJpro�riate 
policy arenas. The resulting policy outcome is analogojs tb dhe 
logrolling "coalition of minorities" platform generated lby locr­
rolling, in that intense minorities have a chance to in£luelc 
the final outcome in one dimension of the final policy Jacklg 
It is different from the logrolling outcome because it Js sba�le. 
11 
While the "coalition of minorities" logroll is subject to decay 
through a voters' cycle, autonomous policy arenas can protect 
intense minority preferences indefinitely. Because the "apathetic" 
majority defaults in any given policy arena, a system of multiple 
policy arenas would seem to resolve the efficiency problem generated 
by the voting power of apathetic majorities, just as argued by 
Dahl. 
As an example, we might think in terms of a national 
legislature which is divided into working committees. If the 
members of each committee tend to be those legislators who are 
most intensely interested in the policy area represented by that 
committee, and if a norm o.f ·reciprocity operates between com-
mittees to support the autonomy of each policy arena, then we 
would have a pluralist system ideally designed to protect 
interested minorities from majorities. 
Perhaps even more starkly, we might imagine a community 
in which there is a separate school board, and a separate redevelop-
ment agency, as well as a city government. And we may again 
assume that the teachers' union would devote its limited resources 
to promoting certain candidates for the school board rather than 
for the .:redevelopment agency, and the Chamber of Commerce would 
devote its influence resources in the reverse pattern. At the 
local level the different institutions of government constitute 
even more perfectly autonomous policy arenas. 
The question then becomes, what does the public-choice 
literature have to say about such a system of decentralized 
ofpolicy arenas? The answer is
.
fairly clear from the literatrr 
social choice, that whatever its other advantages, such a p�u alisit I decentralized institutional system cannot generate marketlike 
efficiency. The first indication of this came from Sen �s Llb ral
Paradox (1970, pp. 152-157). 
Imagine a set of individuals who are making collective 
ohoice• with re•pect to a •e' x of al'e�'ive•. Each �dj�•�1 
ha• a preference ordering over <he a1'ernaoive" and Jh rHble 
,., of preference ordering• c�•'i'ute• a profile of prlferrn•e•. 
A social-decision function associates with each profile lof !prefer­
ence orderings a social-preference ordering. The individual­
preference orderings are given by R., and the social-prlfer1ln�e 
ordering by RS, where xRy may be un:erstood as indicatiJg a
preference for x over y, or indifference. Strong prefelenje is 
given by xPy. Both the individual-preference orderings an� t�e 
social-preference ordering are assumed to be complete (eitJer
xRy or yRx for all pairo of al'e=ativeo). refl�ive cl tr 
every alternative) and transitive (xRy and rYz imply xRj fo.r all 
triples of alternatives). 
We would like to place two restrictions on such a 
social-decision function. The first is Pareto optimaliJy: 
given any pair of alternatives, if xPiy for all individjals] 
in society, then xPsY· 
For the second condition, imagine that the socia 
ordering is arrived at by a social-decision function thlt Js
partially decentralized: that is, there are two alternltijes 
I 
(x and y) out of X that are decided in one policy arena, and two 
other alternatives (u and v) which are decided in another policy 
arena. There is a group of decisive individuals in each policy 
arena, such that if everyone in Group I prefers x to y, then the 
social preference is xR8y; if everyone in Group II prefers u to 
v, then the social preference is uR8v. Groups I and II are 
mutually exclusive, but not necessarily collectively exhaustive 
of N. 
There must be some group that is decisive for every 
pair of alternatives, namely set N of all individuals. By 
assuming decentralization, we are simply formalizing the 
pluralist notion that differ individuals are concerned and 
involved in different matters. If, for instance, the same 
majority could enforce a social ordering for all pairs of 
alternatives, then we would indeed have the kind of situation 
described by Dahl, in which an apathetic majority was cramming 
everything down the throats of interested minorities. Our 
formalization of decentralization is the barest possible form of 
decentralization: if the group that can enforce x over y is a 
majority, then there is some minority exclusive of that majority 
which has, as a minimum, the right to enforce u over v. 
Now, because the social ordering must be defined for 
all preference profiles, we can examine the following particular 
profile: 
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Group I I 
v 
x 
y 
u 
Group II and the re�t b� f 
I I y
u 
v 
x 
I Because everyone in Group I prefers x to y, tihen l tlle 
•ooial pr"orenoe �" be xR5y. Beome everyone in +upl Il 
prefers u to v, the social preference must be uR8v. Because
everyone in society prefers v to x, then the social prJferbnae 
must be vP8x. By transitivity, these three results imJly �dY·  
· But this contradicts another relationship which we can ,derivE 
from the Pareto optimality condition, namely yP8u. 
This contradiction demonstrates that our set lof 
Ji 
� 
assumptions must be mutually inconsistent. That is, w�th a 
social-decision function defined for all profiles yield�ngla
transitive social preference, this minimal degree of deben rali­
zation is inconsistent with Pareto efficiency. For soml pio�iles, 
a decentralized, pluralist government must be either cJclila�ly 
unstable or yield inefficient results. 
But the pluralist will doubtless object to t�is we]l­
known Sen paradox by pointing out that the proof used a f palticulari 
profile of individual preferences which was unpluralist�c; lthat 
is, the Group I individuals were most interested in the l altertatil 
pair v and u (which were at the top and bottom of their prlfe ence 
ordering•), ye< <hey�� deoiai� for a differen< pair l of l 
alternatives. The same inconsistency is true for the p�ople �n 
15 
Group II . There was a most unpluralistic mismatch of preference 
intensity with influence. This mismatch, pluralists could 
conceivably argue , would not occur in the long run , since 
individuals would not utilize their limited influence-resources 
in such a way as to become decisive in the "wrong" policy arena . 
The pluralists would be correct in claiming that the original 
Sen paradox does not deny the possibility of an efficient pluralist 
system. 
The question then becomes whether decentralization and 
efficiency are .compatible if we exclude those profiles of individual 
preferences which make decisive groups more interested in policy 
pairs they are not decisive over , than they are in the pairs for 
which they are decisive . The answer , supplied by Blau (1975 ,  pp . 
395-401) , is still no , provided we allow three policy arenas instead 
of two . 
This pluralist constraint on allowable preference pro-
files is operationalized as follows : if Group I is decisive for 
x over y ,  and if another group is decisive for m over n, then it 
cannot be the case that n is ranked higher and m lower than both 
x and y otherwise Group I would be more intensely interested in m 
and n than in x and y .  We now require the social-preference pro-
files in which the members of each decisive group are not inap-
propriately interested in some other group's alternative pair . Now 
let us examine the preference profiles in Table 1 .  Each group is 
decisive for that alternative pair indicated by the strong arrows 
on the left of the group's preference profile . That each profile 
TABLE 1 
PREFERENCE PROFILES FOR THE BLAU PARADOX 
Group I 
v +--, 
I 
z +--i-.., [
x , 
I I 
U +-...J I I 
' 
y I I 
I w +----l 
II 
III 
Group II 
z +--, 
I 
y +-.+.., [
U I 
I I 
W +-...J I 
I 
I 
V I I 
' 
x +---...l 
III 
I 
Group inl afl.d 
the rTst tof l .N 
y +-�. 
--7- w :
I v +-
x +-
..._.. z 
u 1+-LJ 
I 
,I 1 
11111 
II 
] 
] 
17 
fits the constraint defined earlier is indicated by the dotted 
arrows , indicating that no group's preferences for its own decisive 
alternative pair is bracketed by the preference pair of some other 
decisive group. 
We also have three pairs of alternatives whose ranking 
is determined by unanimity : vP8x ,  zP8u ,  yP8w.  These , combined
with xR y ,  uR v and wR z ,  yield an intransitive preference cycle , 
violating the condition of transitivity . Once again, decentrali-
zation must be inconsistent with either Pareto efficiency or transi-
tivity, even when preference intensity is not incongruent with 
influence .  A pluralist system, in which groups o f  individuals exert 
their influence resources , even in a very limited way, in decen-
tralized policy arenas (as in New Haven) runs the inevitable risk 
of inefficiency . 
As an example , we can imagine a pluralist community 
consisting of three kinds of people : teachers , downtown business-
men, and golfers . The teachers want a pay raise ,  the downtown 
businessmen want a redevelopment proj ect , and· t�e golfers want 
a new golf course .  ·The cost 'of these three projects is CT , CD ,
and CG , respectively . The cost of all proj ects approved is
 T D shared equally by all three groups . The benefits are B , B ,
and BG , respectively , and the benefits are felt by each group
individually. In order for each group to promote public approval 
of its project , it must be the case that the net benefit would 
be greater than zero : Bi - t.Ci > O ;  where t. is the share of
i i 
total costs paid by group i .  In this case,  where ti = 1/3 ,
it must be the case that Bi/Ci > 1/3 .
Now imagine that decisions are made by a 
rule . In this case,  any group can veto any proj ect ; 
package of proj ects that can pass is the 
proj ects . And this package will only be passed if the 
benefit to each group is greater than zero : 
or 
i i B - til:C > O ;
Bi
i::ci 
> t . . 
i 
Summing over all three groups , this condition implies 
l:Bi
i::ci
> 1 .  
That is , with a unanimity rule , the only package of 
will be approved is one that satisfies an aggregate 
ratio greater than one , although the cost-benefit 
vidual projects may be less than one . 
Now imagine that the community requires 
a legislature (consisting in the particular example 
numbers of representatives of downtown business , 
golfers) .  Legislative approval requires a proportion 
positive votes , where k is somewhere between one-half 
In this case, the efficiency condition is that a 
passed only if the sum of the benefits of 
package , divided by the sum of the costs shared by the groups 
voting for the package, is greater than k .  That is , if W is 
the majority coalition 
I Bi
iEW 
> k.  I Ci
iEW 
For instance , if the businessmen and golfers combined , the 
individual rationality constraint and maj ority rule require that 
BG+ BD
CG +CD
> 
2 
3 
This represents a drop in efficiency , as aggregate benefits over 
aggregate costs may be less than one . However ,  if the majority-
rule legislature is replaced with a system of plural policy-
arenas , even this efficiency requirement is not met . If the 
downtown businessmen have a majority in the redevelopment agency ; 
the teachers ' union has been instrumental in the election of a 
majority on the school board , and if a majority of the city 
council are golfers , then each policy arena is relatively 
autonomous . As long as Bi/Gi is greater than t. = 1/3 , each
1 
interest group has a dominant strategy to pass its own proj ect ,  
no matter what the other two groups do (see Figure 1) . The net 
result is that all three groups will pass their proj ects , and 
the efficiency constraint is only that 
1:Bi
1:Gi
> 
1 
3 
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Yes 
DoWJtown � 
Reddveloement 
No 
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FIGURE 1 
PAYOFFS TO BUSINESS, GIVEN ALL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
" II 
Teachers' Pav Raise 
/ \ 
. Yes No 
New Golf Course New GolJ Course 
/"""' y� 
�II 
Yes No w 
D c0+cT+CG D c
0+cT Yes 
BD - C
DJG f B - --- B --3- -3-1 BD 3 3 
Downtown � 
RedeveloE,ment 
CT+CG C
T No 
CG 
--3
- -3 T 
I I 
-----� 
While each group has a dominant strategy to use its control of 
its autonomous policy arena to pass its own project, the result 
is a prisoner's dilemma. 
In general, if there are n autonomous policy arenas, 
dominated by n decisive interest groups, with each interest 
group paying tax share ti of the total package of projects, the 
efficiency constraint is 
irn. > ti wi 
where ti is the average tax-share. As the number of policy
arenas increases, the efficiency constraint diminishes to zero. 
PART TWO: COOPERATION AS A SOLUTION 
21 
The representativeness critique of pluralism that comes 
out of Olson, Frohlich and Oppenheimer, together with the 
efficiency critique that comes out of the social-choice literature, 
suggests that pluralist politics may at times violate efficiency 
in order to serve the largely upper- and middle-class interests 
of the organizations represented in the plural policy arenas. 
One possible solution to this problem is the same that 
is suggested for the prisoner's dilemma: if the players in a 
prisoner's dilemma can forge a binding agreement to cooperate, 
then the problem of suboptimality is overcome. Surely it is 
precisely the function of government to provide a forum and a 
sanction for just this kind of binding agreement. Thus, at the 
II 22 
Seidman and others may critique tHe 
1. k" 1.1 po icy-ma ing among numerous po iqy 
frarr-
1 sub 
national level, while 
mentation of national 
governments, Congress is after all available as a forum Ito 
guarantee that autonomous subgovernments overcome any prioblemlof 
suboptimality. Thus, if the government as a whole would belefit 
by a cooperative agreement between the Army Corps of EnJinelr 
and the Bureau of Reclamation, for instance, then CongrJss ls 
available to hammer out a cooperative agreement and to Jnfolcd it. 
Cooperation: "Two Sovereign Powers" 
However, the limitations of this approach to solv�nd the 
probl� of plurali•m are large. A few exampl� il1M<1a<el '
limitations. According to Grant McConnell, two rival public­
works subgovernments, claiming the allegiance of the Anly cbrus 
of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, have sacrif�cedl a 
loe of �rgy in ''head-on oonflioe•" wieh mpeo< en d+loj>m4n< 
of wa<er polioy in ebe King• Rim P<ojeoe, ehe Mia•our
, 
bali 
and elsewhere. For example, by the early 1940s both arenasl had 
rival plans for the development of the Missouri basin. 
I
In brder 
to avert the kind of unpopular and wasteful conflict that obcurred 
in the Kings River Project, "representatives of the burJau ln 
the corps met and 'reconciled' the two plans. The resuJtink rllan 
was then hurriedly presented to Congress, which gave itj ap�rdval 
and a m�daee for apeedy ooM<ruoeion" (1966, p. 224) • Buel Whae 
ae�ed on <he •urfaoe <o be a oonperaeive •olu<ion, ave
,
einl 
inefficient conflict, did not guarantee efficiency. The Pibk�Sloart 
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Plan, which reconciled the difference between the two governments , 
was a simple consolidation of almost all the projects 
proposed by both agencies , with none of the inherent con­
flicts of purpose resolved and with specific glaring incon-
sistencies retained • • •  It was the sort of agreement 
that would not have been surprising had it been made by two 
sovereign powers confronted by a third at whose expense the 
two could collaborate for their mutual benefit . In the 
Missouri Basin , however , the third party consisted of the 
United States and those members of its broad constituency 
whose interests were not served by either agency within 
the territories that the jurisdictional settlement allotted 
to each . [p . 224] 
For instance ,  one of the proj ects to grow out of the 
Pick-Sloan Plan was the Bureau of Reclamation's Garrison Diversion 
Project which has been so controversial in recent years . This 
project provides irrigation water to 1 , 200 farm families in North 
Dakota by means of a 300 mile long canal , and at an average subsidy 
of $300 ,000 per farm. While the principal benefit was to provide 
irrigation water to farms that were already dry-farming profitably 
anyhow, the costs have included obliterating other farms , depri-
ving still other farms whose sources of underground water were 
eliminated by the construction of the canal , salt pollution of 
water going into Canada, and the elimination of prairie wetland 
wildlife habitat . While a group of outside experts concluded that 
the benefit-cost ratio of the proj ect was significantly less than 
one (instead of the bureau ' s  estimate of up to 1 . 67) the only source 
of opposition was late in coming , and was from the government of 
I I 2' 
Canada and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service .  
Clearly, i t  was not in the interests of the conguessmen I I who have benefited from the division of the spoils in the Mistour� 
Basin to raise questions about the overall efficiency o1 tJe ateJ 
policy in that area ; and other congressmen are generallt tJo much 
preoccupied with the projects that are essential for thlir lo 
reelection to work for anything as nebulous as a cooperltive ,
efficient solution between rival subgovernments . It is l diJficult 
to campaign for reelection on such a platform. 
Cooperation: The "Delicate Ediface" 
This is not to say that it is never attempted L Senator 
Adlai Stevenson Jr . ' s  efforts with regard to reorganizahioJ o� the 
Senate committee system is another example . The congrelsiJna
committee system is the central element in the national syJtem of
plural policy arenas . The congressional committee or subcJmm�ttee 
provides the legislative authority and political supporh fJr �he 
preference policies within a particular policy subgoverlmelt ,I and 
the norm of reciprocity between subcommittees and commihtels bro­
vides the necessary guarantee of autonomy between diffekenl sub­
governments . By 1977 there was a total of 31 standing , l splci�l , 
select,  and j oint committees for the 100 senators to serve lont and a total of 170 subcommittees . This was considered to bl too any.I I I because every Democrat was , on the average , the chairman of two 
subcommittees and a member of many more . It was evidenhly l feit 
by many that the problems of providing efficient , coopekative! 
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policy-making among such a large number of policy subgovernments 
were too much to overcome ; and as a result there was in early 
1977 a strong effort to cut down the number of committees to make 
committees more inclusive and integrative . In particular , the 
number of committees was going to be cut from thirty-one to fif-
teen. This plan had the backing of party leadership, which com-
mitted $300 , 000 to study· the problem. The new freshmen and the 
defeat of several key committee chairmen seemed to make the time 
ripe for a wholesale reform of the committee system. 
The description of the attempted reform effort sounds 
very much like an attempt to cooperatively overcome the ineffi-
ciency of a prisoner ' s  dilemma . The tricky thing about cooperatively 
overcoming a prisoner's dilemma is that if one individual is 
committed to cooperation while other individuals have the opportunity 
to back out , it will be better for the others to back out , leaving 
them in a better position and the "sucker" worse off . If any 
individual does back out of the cooperative agreement , then all 
other individuals who can will hastily back out as well , leaving 
the same inefficient state as before . This is essentially what 
happened to the Senate reorganization plan. 
"Several people told me privately that they would support 
the proposal as long as nobody was exempted , "  said Senator Cannon, 
chairman of the Rules Committee (New York Times , 10 February 1977) . 
To hold the line , Senator Cannon tried to hold the Rules Committee 
meeting on the affair as a closed session . "I just felt that we 
could expedite it . You wouldn't have the press·ure of all the 
I d :I 
z,. 
pressure groups , seeing how the senators voted . "  Alth'.ough tie 
secured the unanimous consent of the Senate to hold a clobe 
drafting session (with only one other senator on the £lool 
bil] 
t th� II enato time) , he also needed the consent of the Rules CommitJee . 
Clark, f=ing = elec,;nn <ha< WM en un<oaC him, nbj,ccea 
closed-door proceedings , and later voted in favor of rleinf t:;lting 
every committee that was slated for consolidation or elimination . 
The decision to keep the hearings open may Jave l selaled 
Che faee of <he pl= . "ill concerned agroed Cha< <he rnrb<IUng 
had occurred because of the intensive lobbying by veteranl 
organizations to save the Veterans Committee • • . •  selatlr 
0 th� 
•aid chac when chey craveled chrnugh cheir •CaCe• Ch•1 ••lehoeC 
by veceran< gr=p• who urged ch� en recain <he ··-r+•<her 
than merge it with the Armed Services Committee . "  The Rule 
Committee buckled , and the Veterans Committee was reijstabe� . 
With that , the collapse of the cooperative effort to clonsll:ildate 
the committee structure of the Senate was assured . "Withl ttle 
virtual assurance that the Veterans Committee would bJ restqred , 
Senator Pell moved for reinstatement of a committee tJat La 
highly regarded by his Rhode Island constituency : smJ11 lusiness 
A< chi< pnine, Senaenr 5'even<nn , che arohi<ecc nf ch, pJ. ,
protested . "If this committee wants reorganization , this l i 
where you make the decision , right now, " he said . "OJce yo 
have done it in one case,  made special exceptions , you l arl gping 
to do it for other groups , and reorganization goes dowh tJe Urain 
You are going to the bone, and if you cut through the �irJt bf 
those bones , the rest are going to get cut too , and the delicate 
ediface is going to come down . "  
Nelson o f  Wisconsin said he had supported abolition of 
Small Business only if it were part of a major reorganization . 
After Small Business , the Special Committee on Aging 
was reinstated . The number of committees to be eliminated was 
reduced from sixteen (over half) to six .  
In the end , the six committees finally eliminated by 
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the reorganization plan included the Senate Committee on Nutrition 
and Human Needs , chaired by McGovern . Told by Cannon that re-
organization required biting the bullet , McGovern asked "Why 
didn't we bite the bullet.on the nine other committees that the 
Senate and the Senator's Committee saw fit to extend? Why 
didn't we bite the bullet on veterans affairs or small business 
or the aging? Is it because these groups have a more potent 
lobby than the hungry poor?" Cannon acknowledged that "we did 
have a lot of pressures in many instances , as the senator knows . "  
This case illustrates both the problems of pluralistic 
politics and the limitations of voluntary cooperation as a way 
of overcoming the problems . Evidently a majority of the 
senators felt that the government would be able to respond with 
more coordinated , efficient policy if the prime institutional 
mechanism for national pluralism, the Senate committee system, 
were consolidated . But , instead of overcoming the limitations of 
pluralistic politics , the consolidation effort ended up being an 
exercise in pluralistic politics , in which the most effectively 
organized interest groups maintained the most important instk­
tutional cornerstone of their respective policy arenas !. lt lthe 
same time , those interest groups unable to muster the leqJired 
political support , most notably the "hungry poor," werl pJrged 
of their voice in the Senate committee structure . 
PART THREE : "PRESSURE SYSTEM" VS . "PARTY SYSTEM" 
As McConnell has written, "a large number of1grqup 
have achieved substantial autonomy for themselves and the I isolation of important segments of government and publtc HOl�cy" 
(1966 , p. 7) . This isolation is at times so severe , that 
2 
inefficiencies cannot be overcome by cooperation alonel. Wh is 
the alternative? 
Fortunately, not all of American politics is based upbn l this 
array of small constituencies . The party system, the
Presidency and the national government as a whole represent 
opposing tendencies . To a very great degree, pol�ciel 
serving the values of liberty and equality [and I wll ould ladd , 
efficiency] are the·achievements of these institutionl .
Public values generally �ust depend upon the creat[on l on a
national constituency . "  [p . 8 ]  
I believe Schattschneider is correct when he tsays 
the creation of a national constituency is the special lfunbt  of the party system. While the groups who are active in the 
au,onomou• policy ar•�• ('h' pr•••ur• •Y•'�) ha� ,hj adta 
of cohesiveness , that advantage does not help in the gale of 
party politics . "The big game is the party game becausle ii 
last analysis there is no political substitute for victlory l i 
hat 
on 
tage 
he 
an 
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election. . • . The party system is by a wide margin the largest
mobilization of people in the country . The parties lack many of 
the qualities of smaller organizations , but they are the 
only organizations that can win elections" (1960 , pp . 58-59) . 
Dahl ' s  New Haven does not serve , by itself , as an 
appropriate case study of plural policy arenas , because New Haven 
has an active party system. While Dahl regarded the party 
system in New Haven as just another policy arena , parallel to 
redevelopment politics and education politics -- another arena 
in which power could be studied as decisions are implemented 
if Schattschneider is correct the presence of parties in New 
Haven is the central fact about politics in New Haven . All 
other policy arenas must ,  in some sense,  be subservient to 
parties because there is "no substitute for victory in an election . "  
However , not all cities have active party systems . 
The reforms instituted by the Progressive Movement weakened the 
party system in many medium-sized cities , and abolished parties 
altogether in others . These latter cities constitute cases in 
which the effects of decentralized policy arenas , sans parties , 
can be most clearly understood . 
Pasadena 
Pasadena is the second oldest city in Los Angeles 
County , incorporated in 1886 during the county's great land-
boom. It soon became nationally known as a gathering place for 
wealthy eastern industrialists and midwestern farmers , who came 
to Pasadena for the winter season and stayed to retireJ The 
term "Old Pasadena" still refers to the remaining reprlsejta 
of this social elite,  most of them living in the southlesjer 
area of the city . 
I 3 
ives 
In Southern California's Progressive revolt , lwe�lt�y 
Pasadenans played a typical role . They undertook to operJte l their 
own municipal water and electric utility plants , and elacJed the 1 
normal , progressive , anti-political-party, electoral mlasjre I I city manager form of government was successfully pushei bl tne wealthy Pasadenans , who hoped that that form of governmenb wbuld 
be useful in maintaining Pasadena's residential qualitJ aJd 1n 
resisting pressures to link Pasadena to Los Angeles by lmeals l of 
railway lines . 
While Pasadena ' s  economy before 1929 was primar�ly 
dependent on the winter tourist trade and the wealthy lasJerners 
who had chosen Pasadena as a place to retire , this pat�e� was 
badly di•�p<ed by <he Depre••i� . Pa•adena'• repu<a<lon � oa 
watering hole for the rich never recovered from the Delressi�n 
or the influx of smog . Pasadena instead began to draw on Ith 
fact that it held the California Institute of Technology do 
a<trao< a �rie<y of "oleao ind=<ry . "  And , in a 195++r< <o 
the Chamber of Commerce , Robert Oliver , a Stanford research 
eoonomi•< , pointed <o growing aign• of urban bligh< in pa1<• l of 
residential and commercial Pasadena , and outlined a pr9gram bf 
redevelopment for the city . 
As in New Haven , policy making in Pasadena is c�aracter��ed 
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by the existence of plural policy arenas . Education is handled 
by a separate school board , covering an area larger than the 
city of Pasadena , and with no links to the local government .  
While the municipal government handles police , fire , library , 
planning ,  parks and recreation , and other normal municipal functions , 
there ar� separate boards for several of these functions which are 
very strong . 
One of the most autonomous policy areas is redevelopment , 
which is handled by the Pasadena Redevelopment Agency (PRA) , 
established in 1959 . The PRA is an independent agency composed 
of commissioners appointed by the Pasadena Council . 
Northwest Pasadena , which had housed the servants of the 
original Pasadena social elite, became one of the few enclaves of 
blacks in the county outside of the city of Los Angeles .  This 
enclave grew as blacks left the central city . The black popu-
lation grew from 12 to 16 percent in the decade of the sixties , 
and by the end of this time , the Spanish-speaking population had 
established itself as a minority population growing at an even 
faster rate.  One of the chief concerns of Pasadena ' s  leaders 
in the seventies came to be that Pasadena ' s  population of minor-
ities would be limited . As the chairperson of Pasadena ' s  
Planning Commission said in a 1979 interview, Pasadena felt it 
had done its fair share in housing the county ' s  poor. 
Pasaden� ' s  political leadership showed little tendency 
to reflect Pasadena ' s  changing population structure . During the 
Progressive Era, Pasadena had adopted the norm of citywide 
ii 
3' 
elections . During the late sixties , this was modified! to l a  
system in which the seven council races had a primary electi! 
each of seven geographic districts , and a runoff betwebn bh� two 
highest in the citywide election . Only if a council clndld�te 
got 60 percent of the vote in the primary was his the bn1J 
that appeared on the citywide ballot . This system had mulh. 
.me 
n in! 
Isame effect that normal citywide elections have : by pilacin 
electoral premium on citywide name recognition and cit�i1e
advertising, it promoted the election of white businesbmel 
professionals and limited the possibilities of minorit� rlp
sentation on the council . 
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Since its establishment in 1959 , the Pasadena Redevelop 
ment Agency has been responsible for several major pro!ecJs ,  
including the location of headquarters of several majot cdmptnies1. 
in Pasadena . However , the largest and most controversial lpr jec� 
has been the retail mall created in downtown Pasadena, l and still 
=der roMt=tion a< the preoent time . E"rhewing the l reJuthtiorr approach so ably criticized by Polsby , we can ask who madJ the k 
decisions in the retail mall proj ect , and who benefite� fjoml the 
key decisions? The key decisions analyzed will be : (1) Jhe
selection of a design for the mall , (2) the selection if 1 develo 
and (3) the selection of a means of financing . 
Design for the Mall . The most salient fact about 
selection of the design for the downtown redevelopment l pr1j e  
that , from the first ,  only a single alternative was consider 
he 
: :
i
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two department-store , covered mall . 
Serious discussion of downtown redevelopment began with 
the Livingston-Blayney Report of 1970 . This report was initiated 
by a group of downtown businessmen known as Pasadena Now, who re-
quested ana·received partial financial· assistance from the city 
government . Louis Vincenti, president and chairman of the board 
of Mutual Savings in downtown Pasadena, was at the time both a 
member of Pasadena Now and the chairman of the Pasadena Redevelop-
ment Agency. The two alternatives considered by the consultants 
in the Livingston-Blayney_ Report were : no community sponsored 
downtown redevelopment (which was rejected out-of-hand) ,  and a 
retail center . More modest alternatives , such as subsidization of 
improvements of present structures , were not considered . Critics 
of the mall claim that no alternative was suggested because 
Pasadena Now and the PRA had already decided that they wanted a 
downtown redevelopment mall , and had made this wish known to the 
developers . 
In addition to Pasadena Now, Vincenti ,  and the PRA, the 
proponents of the retail mall included Assistant City Manager Don 
Pollard, who had been hired in 1969 after having been instrumental 
in the creation of the Fresno mall . The coincidence in timing 
between the acquisition of Pollard with the support of the down-
town businessmen, and the Livingston-Blayney Report has not been 
overlooked by the opponents of the mall . Pollard has been in a 
key position in local government ,  and able to ensure that city 
administration is uniformly behind the retail mall proj ect. One 
3
minority politician pointed to Pollard as one of a "small fgriJup 
of people" who "decided a long time ago to redevelop dlwntio 
They hired all the ' pushers ' in the city government . �haj ' s lwhy 
all the staff are for it . They were hired to be for ib . 11 
Several city employees felt that their jobs would be jlopardlzed 
if they made critical remarks about the mall to researlhejs tram 
Caltech , and claimed that members of the Planning CommlssJonl had 
been forced off the commission because of their positiJns bn l the 
ratail �11 . Thla waa confl�ad , moat aurprlaingly by lMaylr 
White , who (along with many of the city council) remained latther 
passive as regards the retail mall , but admitted to di�liJin
"this attitude that ' if you ' re not for us , you ' re agailst lus1 ' "
and said that "there are certain people who just don ' tf geti 
appointed or reappointed to advisory commissions [because lf 
their attitudes on the retail center] "  (Isaac 1977 , p .  [ 24) ,. 
In 1977 , when a member of the Cultural Heritage lCoF­
mission opposed demolition of an historic building on bheip 
posed retail center site , she was replaced without warling . I May 
White then wrote a private letter of apology to her , wlic� b�cam, 
public . Ha =•<a that tha rat all c=tar "h"' bac�a + l 
Vietnam War • • • •  People are characterized as for it pr lgalinst 
it . Depending on which side of the question you fall , 1  or l ane 
placed , you become with us or against us • . . •  You hare 
been characterized as them, foe, against us . • • .  There 
more honest way to describe the action of the Board labt we 
I I than as an act of retribution, for vindictive purposes/' (Th 
rent 
0 
I 
,, 
Altadenan, 18 August 1977) . 
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For four years there was a general selling job done for 
the idea of a retail mall, but no specific plan was proposed . Then, 
in 1974 , the Pasadena Planning Commission was presented with a 
package that included the design, financing , developer and an 
Environmental Impact Report .  Once again, there were no alternatives 
presented to the Planning Commission : it was a two department-store 
retail mall or nothing. The Planning Commission approved the 
Environmental Impact Report , with two dissenters , including 
Robert Oliver, the Stanford economist who had moved to Pasadena 
shortly after issuing the 1959 report which first called for 
redevelopment in Pasadena; As Oliver said a few years later , 
As a member of the Planning Commission , I asked repeatedly 
for meetings dedicated to a discussion of the Livingston 
Blayney report and long range plans for Pasadena . But I 
was always told to wait until the redevelopment agency had 
a specific proposal . It was too early . Then, when a 
tentative proposal was presented , we were told that agree­
ments with the developer had already been signed . There 
was no turning back. Suddenly it was "too late . "  [Isaac 
1977 , p .  20] 
The PRA was using techniques used by powerful administrative 
agencies everywhere -- controlling the agenda, presenting propo-
sals as faits accomplis , limiting discussion and information 
flows -- in order to get authorization for preferred alternatives 
from public representatives .  
In January of 1975 the City Board of Directors approved 
the disposition and development agreement between the PRA and the 
developer chosen by the PRA, Ernest Hahn. By July of tl.97.? , lthe 
J .  C .  Penney Company signed a commitment to build a stbre l irl the 
retail center. By a year later , the financing was arrlnged,I and 
still no serious alternatives to a two department-stor� mll
I 
:I 3c 
were ever considered. 
I  Part of the reason for this was the fact thal the: ubl� had virtually no awareness that the mall decision had beel ade . I 
What information there was was all positive . It was nbt in il tJ 
financing • ., arranged in 1976 that �ny people bee""! �lr thal 
the mall had been located in the middle of the scenic ,cenhe:rl of 
p.,"'1�a �d =uld , in facO , be built in ohe cenoer "I whtt '"" 
up until then the wide boulevard stretching from the oQd Pasadena 
library, past the lovely city building , to the auditon[lium  IAt 
that time, the storm of protest began to break . 
Although it was essentially too late at that time ,I the 
board of directors passed a "gag order" to try to cont nul �o keev 
the lid on the retail mall project .  This ordinance wjs plsJed i� 
August of 1976 to stop any city employees from giving lny l irlfor­
mation "regarding any aspect of the retail center" to leithe:rl a 
city councilperson as an individual or to any member o!f t�e lpubl�rr 
Selection of a Developer for the Mall . The story lof ho
the developer for the mall was cho
-
s
-
en came out as a relsulh df a 
lawsuit ""'°lving the lack of c�petitive bidding fur �he citra1• 
to build the publicly owned parking garage for the malQ . C tra� 
in the selection of the developer was Gerald Trimble , lxecu ive 1 
director of the PRA since 1969 . 
The executive director of the Pasadena Redevelopment 
Agency , Gerald Trimble , was hired after a meeting with Louis 
Vincenti and one other member of the PRA Board . There was no 
advertisement for the job .  At the meeting with Pings and Vin-
centi,  at which Trimble was first interviewed , he was also told 
that he was hired , and was given carte blanche authority to put 
the retail center together . 
Trimble ' s  carte blanche authority extended to Ernest 
Hahn as the central developer for the retail mall . By March 1 ,  
1972 , before there had been a vote by the PRA Board o r  city 
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council on the retail mall , the PRA had printed a brochure saying 
that the PRA was committed to the retail center project . And 
by the same date , Trimble had signed for the PRA an agreement 
which bound the PRA to negotiate exclusively with Hahn for the 
development of the retail center . 
Ernest W .  Hahn Incorporated has constructed numerous 
shopping malls throughout Southern California . The contract that 
was worked out with Hahn allowed him to buy the air rights over 
a publicly owned parking garage , on which he would construct the 
mall . The PRA paid over $20 million for land , relocation and 
clearing costs for three square blocks , and over $13 million for 
the construction of the underground garage . Hahn then sold the 
air rights for $4 . 4  million. Counting the interest costs , it 
would have taken him well over $100 million to procure the same 
air rights for himself . 
In addition , Hahn was granted the right to build tne 
underground parking garage himself . Despite the fact hhaj s�ate 
law requirea �y publie proj �< �eeeding $ 2 , 500 Co be l opfn go 
competitive bidding, Hahn won the contract with no open bidd�ng . 
When sued by a private citizen on this point , the PRA legll 
counsel argued that this lapse was valid because the clnslrul 
of this publicly owned parking garage "involved both plbl�c and 
private interests , "  so the requirement of competitive JidJin 
not apply. The court ignored this defense , but ruled lhaj tne 
day statute of limitations on public objections to violat�onl of 
bidding requirements had run out , so the contract was l11dwetl to
stand . 
Hahn' s  chief architect for his numerous shopping c 
projects in Southern California was Charles Kober AssobiaJes
Kober , for instance , is working for Hahn as the architlct lfo 
retail center on a contingency fee . That is , ·he 
fee, plus a bonus which will be given at the end 
Hahn is satisfied with Kober ' s  work. 
works f fo:ri a 
of the pJoj 
In addition to being Hahn ' s  architect ,  however, IKober 
was selected as the PRA architect to supervise Hahn, al cdntrR�ro�1u 
He waa hired by Exeeucive Direecor Trimble , wich che alpr� of 
the PRA Board . In his capacity as PRA architect on thl retall 
mall proj ect , it is Kober ' s  j ob to okay additional explnsjs on 
the construction of the parking garage by Hahn. When bhe IP 
staff decides it wants any changes in the original design,! Hahn 
says how much the changes will cost ,  and Kober authoriles Ith 
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extra expenditure . The construction of the garage was originally 
estimated at $10 million; it is now estimated that the final cost 
will be closer to $14 million . The construction of the project , 
for which Hahn has no performance bond, is on a cost plus fifteen 
percent basis . 
Once the parking garage is constructed by Hahn , Hahn , 
as dev�loper of the mall , will lease the garage with a fifty-year 
lease ,  getting any profit from the parking fees , if he decides to 
institute such fees . While the nominal lease payment is $396 , 000 
a year , any property taxes Hahn pays on the parking garage will be 
subtracted from that amount , up to the full amount of the lease 
payment .  The redevelopment agency pays all operation ?nd mainte-
nance costs for the garage . 
Financing the Mall. How is the PRA getting the money to 
finance this large subsidy to Hahn? Originally , the plan called 
for lease-revenue bonds , totalling $62 million , to be used to 
clear the three square blocks of the mall site and build the 
parking facility . PRA ' s  basic source of money is its tax incre-
ment authority . The PRA is authorized to create redevelopment 
areas ; when it does so , the property assessments in the redevelop-
ment areas are immediately frozen . The normal city , county , and 
school district tax rate is applied to any increase in market 
value over the fr�zen level of assessments ,  and this money goes 
to the PRA. Thus , the school district and the county are deprived 
of any benefits of increases in property value within the 
I 
JI 
redevelopment area whether caused by inflation , natural incr�ases 
in property values , the actions of the PRA, or whatevel . IFurthermore , under redevelopment law,  the PRA's l use of 
this automatic flow of resources is not subj ect to aud�t , l e�en 
by a grand jury. This financial independence must be legarded I I as the greatest source of autonomy for Pasadena's rede�el9pment 
arena . 
The PRA created a large downtown redevelopment araa 
covering 340 acres in the late sixties . Money from thk tlx
ment authority began to come in automatically during tle le 
nc
�il .ntie 
as inflation increased property values . 
By the mid-seventies , the redevelopment agenfy ias 
ready to capitalize on this flow of resources by borrowing tio 
finance the retail mall . Under the original funding plopdsa� , 
the PRA would sell lease-revenue bonds totaling $62 milliln .  
The money would b e  used t o  clear the retail mall site lnd tol I 
build the parking garage .  The parking structures woulk be 1 ased I I to the city , and the lease revenue would be used to pay off �he 
bonds . Tax increment authority money would be used tol reJayl the 
city. 
This program was approved by the Pasadena Board l of 
Directors (City Council) with little controversy in Aukustt o 
1976 . This program, however ,  was referendable , and ov�r 5 , 000 
signatures were raised in the next few weeks to oppose l thl r[tail =11 and '" =ka Cha finoocing of Cha proja" appm •t Ja all[
As one city director said , "there are concerns about this lpa ticui 
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decision we 've made , and I would be willing to bet that in the 
last five years , this is probably the only one that could have 
gotten this many signatures" (Transcript of City Board meeting , 
21 September 1976) . 
However , on September 21 , the board of directors 
heard the chairman of the PRA cancel his request for city involve-
ment in the financing of the retail mall , since that involvement 
was what made the financing referendable . He proposed instead 
that the financing be by means of tax-allocation bonds , to be re-
paid directly by the tax increment authority of the PRA. The 
disadvantage of this method was that the interest rate of tax-
allocation bonds would necessarily be higher because they would 
not be backed by the city ; their advantage was that they were not 
referendable for the same reason . The PRA was suddenly willing 
to pay the higher interest rate rather than let the public vote 
on the retail mall . Said Pings , "with all due thanks to your 
willingness as a city board and as a city , your willingness to 
allow us to consider the lease-revenue mechanism, the PRA would 
prefer to switch to tax allocation bonds" (ibid . ) . 
To objections from the floor that the city be allowed 
to vote on the retail mall , Director Yokaitis argued that he was 
satisfied that the public was behind the retail mall, and that 
public participation had been adequate through the series of public 
hearings on the matter . To this Director Wilfong responded that 
"I still contend that the majority of people in the city don' t  know 
much of anything about what the retail center is all about , and 
I 
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many of them don ' t  even know that there is a retail center b�ing 
proposed . "  Director Wilfong, who turned out to be the swin 
vote , was won over by the argument that the referendum woll 
only be a referendum on the means of financing the mali , ln 
that the decision to build the mall had already been �de l . �he 
directors voted 4-2-1 to repeal the lease-revenue ordihanle .  
Opposition to the retail mall still had not brgln�zed 
at this time ; the petition signatures had essentially leei tlhe 
work of a few individuals . It was only after the finalciig lcon­
flict that Pasadenans for Responsible Planning organiz�d fo !in­
stitute a lawsuit based on the alleged inadequacy of the En�iron 
�"U ImpaoC Repon . The o.,e "" <hro� our of rhe rjd bur 
even before the case was resolved , the PRA was procee�Qngl �th 
acquisition of land for the proj ect .  Essentially all lthe j or 
decisions had been made about the proj ect before the o�posirlion 
managed to become organized . 
SS . 
I 
The reasons for this tardy organization offer an 
illustration of problems with pluralism and representJtivkn 
The groupe rhar �re �er lnrereered in rbe d�to� �de� 
issue were already organized to support the administr�tivi 
opmen 
ecis�II makers who had been hired to implement a retail mall . The roups 
th J 
ted 
who disliked the retail mall concept were a diverse g�
l
oupl w 
natural basis of organization. They included groups �ntere 
in Pasadena ' s  historical heritage ; businessmen from ojtsihe lof 
the downtown area who felt the mall would hurt their Jusihe�s ; 
self-appointed community "watch dogs " ;  racists who feJt tla the 
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mall would attract large numbers of blacks to Pasadena to shop, 
to work, and perhaps to look for housing; liberals who disapproved 
of redevelopment financing methods and the closed decision-pro-
ces s .  The costs associated with organizing such a diverse group 
were large .  
While the mall represented a major bread-and-butter 
issue for downtown businessmen, it was a much less intense issue 
for the heritage group , the racists , and liberals , all of whom 
had other pressing matters of concern. Bussing was of more con� 
cern to both the racists and the liberals , and divided the two 
groups . As a result,  the people who stayed with the issue the 
longest were the self-appointed watchdogs of local government ,  
one o f  whom was an articulate young man who seemed to get posi-
tive benefits out of taking on the local government ; and the 
second of whom was a retired IRS auditor who regarded the money 
and time spent on the issue as a legacy to the city . Obviously , 
the funds available to this group of people was smaller than that 
available to the proponents of the mall, who had tapped into 
public financing through the PRA 's  tax-increment authority . Half 
of the $10 , 000 necessary for the unsuccessful lawsuit was directly · 
donated by the retired IRS auditor . 
The Efficiency of the Mall : Countywide Perspective 
From the standpoint of the county as a whole , the case 
of redevelopment projects , financed out of tax-increment authority , 
is clearly an example of the Blau paradox discussed earlier in 
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this paper . Each of the autonomous city governments in tlie fount 
is reliant on property tax and sales tax revenue . Beclusl o� th� 
they must compete for revenue-producing economic activltils such 
as retail malls . The primary beneficiaries of this coLpeJitaon 
are the county ' s  large developers and businesses , whicl ale able 
to locate in the j urisdiction that is able to "bid" thl hlghl;st 
in the form of subsidized infrastructure and land . As l twJ 
critics of the system explain , redevelopment "doesn ' t  !ittlac 
new development to the county so much as determine whele Jt will 
locate -- in this city or that" (Los Angeles Times , 23 JaJuafy 
1977) . With all cities competing for the same developmenJ , it 
is not clear that the final geographic distribution oflbuJiness i 
much different than it would be if this competition di l nollt take 
place; but any city that does not participate, given the 
institutional framework, is certain to lose out . The lndiv�dual 
oitie• are foroed to play a pri•o�r ' a  dil�a ·�· wirh la
other . This factor was foremost in the mind of the princip 
pro-11 baoker on <he oHy board , who argued tha< "perl! 
build retail centers go to where the cheaper land is , and l i 
don ' t  make it available through the redevelopment procbss � ilt 
isn ' t  going to happen in downtown Pasadena" (ibid . ) . 
The end result of this prisoner ' s  dilemma isl thatthe aggregate , a super-optimal level of resources is slpenl 
in 
n 
d 1 . E h . . . . I re eve opment proJ ects . ac city maximizes its own fevenu 
equating its own marginal cost with marginal gain in saleJ-tax 
revenue . Since the marginal cost felt by the individull Jit
by 
is 
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a small fraction of the total cost to the county (in terms of 
loss of county and school district property tax revenue) there is 
a huge tendency to have an oversupply of redevelopment proj ects . 
This would seem to be the case in the Pasadena shopping 
region . In this one shopping region , there is a shopping mall at 
Arcadia, a shopping mall at Glendale , a shopping mall at Eagle 
Rock, and another being sought in South Pasadena . 
Thus , as in the Blau paradox , each city is more concerned 
with getting its own redevelopment project approved, than with 
stopping other projects , which it is powerless to do anyway . 
However , the negative externality associated with all other rede-
velopment projects is greater than the positive benefit of 
approving its own project : each city would be better off if it 
were not competing for retail centers by means of tax-increment 
financing . By 1977 , $80 million in tax-increment financing was 
going to subsidize developers in the various redevelopment areas 
around the county . 
This analysis , however ,  is generated by assuming that 
individual cities act as rational maximizers . However ,  this 
assumption could be incorrect if within the city of Pasadena , 
the redevelopment policy arena is so autonomous that redevelopment 
proj ects exceed even that point at which the tax cost foregone 
by the city exceeds the tax gain . That is , the autonomy of 
policy arenas within Pasadena may generate inefficiencies even 
from the standpoint of Pasadena as a closed system. 
The Efficiency of the Mall : Pasadena ' s  Perspective 
Fiorina (1978) has developed an argument to demdns 
why inefficiently high levels of government activity mly Je 
lated to the institutionalized incentives within Congrlss .I 
aspect of the argument is that the institution of recibrodit 
between committees guarantees autonomy to individual cb�tt 
which allows a "universalistic" attitude toward the di1trJbu 
proj ects which individual legislators see as being neclss1ry 
their reelection . Within the different policy-related l co� 
the tendency is to let each congressman have his proj ect ; I th 
autonomy between policy arenas guaranteed by reciprocihy all 
each committee to make much policy unfettered by the mljojit 
congressmen outside that committee . 
I 
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An even stronger autonomy exists in PasadenaL At 
wi'h re•pec' '" rede�lnpmen, , �y of 'he �jnr deci•�� ( 
as design, developer , architect , etc . )  take place largely l ou 
of city government . Even those decisions which are molt cen 
and most controversial , such as the financing of the ml11 J t 
(The "gag rule" La+ · 
at councilmen as much as at the public . )  Even the maybr tal.lks 
about decisions made by the board in a passive , apologbtil 
Within the city of Pasadena, it is quite posbible �hat 
this autonomy of policy arenas acts , as it does in Conkrels ,I to 
produce a level of government growth beyond efficiency l Jhe
individuals active in the redevelopment policy arena cltaJf 
members , board members , downtown business groups) certlin1y
to be ushered through automatically . ecte 
.y .  
ould 
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seem to have no incentive to spend less than all the available 
increment-authority money . (This money comes to them automati-
cally, and by redevelopment law is not subj ect to audit , even by 
a grand jury . )  
And is this public subsidy efficient from the standpoint 
of the city? This is hard to tell , since the benefits of improving 
the downtown are not clearly measurable , and neither are many of 
the costs , including increased congestion and noise ; increased 
demand for police and fire services and . other city services , and 
loss of at least one architectural landmark. Robert Oliver , the 
one outside economist to become involved in the project , claims 
that 
The financial infeasibility of the Retail Center is , I think, 
beyond dispute . PRA spokesmen admit that property tax revenue 
from the entire 340-acre downtown redevelopment area will be 
needed to pay off the bonds the PRA will sell to build the 
3 , 380 parking spaces ($16 , 000 per parking space) for the 14 . 9  
acre • • • Retail Center • • • Projections by the PRA are that
property tax revenue will increase by $47 million, more or 
les s ,  between now and 1999 (when the bonds will be paid off) 
if the Retail Center is built,  and sales tax revenue will 
increase by an additional $7 million ($340 ,000 a year) . 
That ' s  $54 million total projected return by the end of the 
century, long before which the Retail Center is likely to 
be obsolete . Over the same period , the PRA will have paid 
out $52 million in principal and an additional $57 million, 
more or less , interest .  [McCallum 1977 , p .  15 ] 
Redevelopment Politics 
The remarkable thing about the key decisions made in 
Pasadena was the degree to which they were made autonomously 
within a single policy arena, and never made it into t�e Ja�l!:er 
political system. 
won or 
Schattschneider claims that "conflicts are frequently 
lost by the success that the contestants have i� gJtttng 
the audience involved in the fight or in excluding it , l as Ith 
case may be" (1960 , p .  4) . And again, "we are bound to supp 
therefore that control of the scale of conflict has alLayJ b 
a prime instrument of political strategy, whatever the [ lalgu 
of politics may have been" (p . 8) . 
se 
en 
ge 
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This was the case in Pasadena. The losers in tlie �e­
de�lop�n<-polioy are� <ried <o b�aden <he •oope of l oolfl[ct l 
(1) by placing the issue on the ballot through the refereldu and I I I (2) by making it an issue in councilmanic elections . Their ail 
to do so successfully ensured the failure of anti-redelellp 
'°""' " I I Even Trimble , the director of the PRA, implilit+y mitted that a referendum on development would have kilied l t  
retail center , · when he said that the city board had a bhoic 
"not going ahead or changing the method of financing" lo lvol 
<be referend� (MoCall� 1977 , p .  15) . One of <he pro��! 
councilpersons , a real tor, justified avoiding a referendul b! 
saying that "she feared an election would be divisive lnd l thlat 
citizens would not understand the issues" (Isaac 1977 , [  p . l 21J) . 
She was certainly right that the issue would have beenl divi�ive and conflictual , and as Schattschneider remarks , "the besi 
I 
point at which to manage conflict is before it starts . The ex-
pansion of the conflict may have consequences that are extremely 
distasteful" (1960 , p .  15) . 
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The opponents were equally unsuccessful in the council-
manic races . "He who determines what politics is about runs the 
country , because the definition of the alternatives is the choice 
of conflicts , and the choice of conflicts allocates power" (p . 68) . 
The anti-mall forces were unable to displace the normal issues of 
Pasadena politics , and their failure to do so meant that the council-
manic races were won and lost on other grounds . In the spring of 
1977 , a few months after the anti-mall activists became organized and 
engaged in their lawsuit ; three of the four pro-mall councilmen 
were up for reelection , at the same time that the local school board 
was involved in a heated set of campaign races involving bussing . 
The bussing issue , which divided both the pro-mall and anti-mall 
forces , seems to have blotted out the redevelopment issue : "there 
exist a great number of potential conflicts in the community which 
cannot be developed because they are blotted out by strong systems 
of antagonism" (ibid . ) .  One of the three pro-mall candidates won 
without opposition. One black councilman lost to a neutral black 
candidate on issues unrelated to the mall . In the final race , an 
anti-mall candidate ran against one of the strongest pro-mall 
incumbents , in a district in which the incumbent was regarded as 
safe . The incumbent ran an anti-bussing campaign in an anti-
bussing district , and won reelection by a lopsided margin . 
The one successful attempt to interject redevelopment 
ii 
5 
into Pasadena politics must be regarded as an accident . In ,earll 
1978 , a seat on the city council fell open when Mayor Whibe resi1t�d. 
Reverend Morris Fisher was appointed to the seat afte1 stlf 
examination on the retail mall issue by the principal prolmall 
councilperson, Don Yokaitis . While Fisher honestly replild l that I I he was in favor of finishing the retail mall , it rapidly be¢ame 
appar=t that he waa againat the kind of cloaed-dnor J.l,ti<a 
that brought about the mall . He subsequently opposed a fed vela_ 
ment plan to replace a low-income housing area with a forei ca� 
retail c=Cer ; he oppo"d a redmlopment project whieh +• goinl 
to replace low-income housing with middle-income condJminiti s ,  al 
he finally advocated eliminating the autonomy of the ledJveiopm 
arena by having the city council members appoint them1e1Jes 1 as 
the directors of the PRA. Said Yokaitis , "I was mislld .  I That ' s  
j all there is to it . Fisher has voted against virtually evefy I 1 .  progressive issue before the board since he was appointed" �Los 
Angeles Times 15 April 1979) . 
Fisher responded that he was not against the rede 
ment projects , per se , he was against "the process of ldedis 
being made by a few people for the many , of wiping ou, plop
low and moderate income to help the wealthy" (ibid . ) . 
el op 
ons 
e 0£ 
In the 1978 election, Fisher was opposed byl a youp.g 
lawyer who had been a partner of Yokaitis ' s .  Fisher won l inl the 
diatrict priEary , but by leaa th� 50 perc�t of the �t•, •• 
both names went on the citywide runoff election. At thil ppint , I I Fisher ' s  opponent was endorsed by the pro-mall members of tbe 
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planning collllllission, the redevelopment agency , and the city council .  
With these endorsements ,  Fisher narrowly lost in the citywide 
runoff,  although he won in his own district , and in the low-income 
heart of Pasadena. (At the time this paper is being written , a 
suit is being brought against the citywide runoff election system . )  
Redevelopment and Parties 
What was different about redevelopment in Pasadena and 
in New Haven? I suggest that , in large part , it was that in New 
Haven an elected official manipulated the business collllllunity via 
the redevelopment issue , while in Pasadena the business collllllunity 
manipulated the political machinery .  In New Haven, as Dahl i s  at 
pains to point out , redevelopment had to meet the test of elections , 
as Mayor Lee made the issue a salient plank in his platform. In 
Pasadena , the business collllllunity was able to insulate itself from 
any form of political test .  In New Haven, the "executive-
centered coalition" was able to pick and choose the positions it 
would go to the polls with , from among a variety of issues 
interesting to a variety of pressure groups . If business had 
refused to cooperate with Lee , to accept his leadership , he could 
conceivably have dropped the matter and relied on a different 
issue and a different pressure group for that component of his 
political attractiveness . In Pasadena , the bureaucrats were in 
large part hired to perform on the redevelopment issue alone . Any 
disloyalty to the redevelopment coalition and they would have been 
out on their ears . 
As Schattschneider wrote , "it is a great achievement 
I ii 5' 
of American democracy that business has been forced to 1 · ·' . 
compete for power in the widest arena in the political syJteL" 
(1960 , p .  42) . It is also an achievement of democracy l in lNe 
Haven. However , that is precisely the failing of pluralist 
democracy in Pasadena . Business has been able to insulatJ its 
own polic.y making from the widest arena .
ew 
nee 
ence! 
Why has business been forced into a wide arena �n 
Haven , and not in Pasadena? The difference is not the ex�st 
of plural policy arenas in one city and not the other . B1th
cities are characterized by plural policy arenas .  The di£fe 
is that in Pasadena the policy arenas were able to gain ajtopomy , 
an autonomy that was denied them in New Haven by centrllijin' 
political institutions that did not exist in Pasadena . I IJ s 
Pasadena is playing the game of pluralist pressure politils ,
N� Haven '' playing tha g�• o f  pa<ty polhioa . The l•grlat
achievement of American democracy" that Schattschneider rlf e
ort , 
whiJ 
is the achievement of centralizing political parties , hot I de 
s ti 
en tr 
lizing policy arenas . 
Despite the fact that Dahl treats the "party , non\in 
arena as just another of the three policy arenas analyzed �n
Who Governs? ,  the very existence of this policy arena Jecobe 
central fact , if Schattschneider is correct . Lee argulblyl owed 
his ability to construct an "executive centered coalitJon"I t 
key position in the Democratic party in New Haven. Hojever , 
Pasadena , as in other California Progressive cities , tJe plr
tioriwin: 
the 
his 
in 
ies 
were eliminated as viable political organizations . 
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In California, as  elsewhere , "Progressivism did assert 
a public interest , but its vision of this interest was never 
clear • • • •  If parties were to be emasculated , what would be 
left save government by the expert ,  government in the name of a 
public whose multitudes could never speak except through interest 
groups • • " (McConnell 1966 , p .  4 7) • 
In Pasadena , both the government expert and the private 
interest groups were agreed upon the desirability of redevelopment , 
and upon the desirability of depriving the others of speaking 
through the electoral process .  As the Pasadena councilperson 
remarked, "an election would be divisive and the citizens would 
not understand . "  
The pressure system is domimated by those interests 
intense enough and wealthy enough to support permanent political 
organization. Conflicts among these private interests "are taken 
into the public arena precisely because someone wants to make 
certain that the power ratio among the private interests most 
immediately involved shall not prevail " (Schattschneider 
1960 , p .  38) . The only instrument capable of forcing these 
private interests into the public arena -- interests that are 
relatively powerless in the pressure system -- is the permanently 
organized political party , which may win elections with issues . 
By bringing redevelopment politics into the arena of 
party politics , Lee , on the other hand, was able to play the 
central role in redevelopment , using the favorable public response 
to redevelopment both to keep himself elected and to wrench control 
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of 
inin\ 
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of the key decisions regarding redevelopment out of the hand 
those most interested in it . "If there are twenty thoJsaJd 
pressure groups ,  and two parties , who has the favorabll bJrg 
position" (p . 57) ? Lee was able to identify his party wiJh 
velopment ; by so doing , he was able to provide the backerJ o 
redevelopment with a choice of voting for him or votin� aJaihst 
redevelopment . "If business groups can do nothing butl•uJport 
the Republican candidates , the Republican party domina es Ith 
pressure groups" (p . 56) . 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion , I find that the basic discovery of i:he 
pluralists , that there exist plural policy arenas in glve�ment 
instead of a single monolithic power elite , is a broadly lpp[icatii 
di•cove'Y · Hov�er, I find it ironical that in Nev Hafen ! <be 
pluralists picked a setting in which the most remarkabie �o " tic_. I I . lphenomenon was not the presence of plural policy arenas , bu the 
presence of an active , energetic party system in the dkiv1r ' s  se • 
capable of providing in<egra<ing '"'1 con<rolling poli<�J oade1
1
1
.
�iliip • 
The proble� of decentraliaed policy are�• a�lyaed in t�e ubl
l choice literature c�repre•entativ�eaa and inefficie
l
ly) v 'e n� 
apparent in Dahl ' s  discussion of New Haven just because it asn ' � 
the pure case of a pluralist system. 
Other local and state governments are not so In
these governments , the fundamental fact is that plura poli y arjlilits 
are relatively autonomous and the public has no voice oth1r lthan 
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through those interest groups organized to speak in those 
specialized arenas . In these governments , I believe , the problems 
of pluralism are not hidden , as they were in New Haven . 
And finally , the federal government underwent its own 
limited version of a Progressive rejection of political party and 
consequent development of fragmerited policy arenas . With the 
destruction of the Republican party machines ,  the creation of 
independent regulatory agencies , and the strengthening of the 
committees through seniority , the subgovernments discussed by 
Seidman and McConnell were initiated . And to a great extent , 
this fragmentizing process has been hastened in the seventies , 
rather than retarded . While the committee system has been 
weakened ,  the major institution to gain from this weakening has 
been the subcommittee , not the legislative party . More than 
half the Democrats in the House are subcommittee chairmen who 
control their own staffs and budgets , in addition to the eighteen 
staff members and $228 , 000 with which to pay them that each 
congressman now gets simply for being a congressman. Lobbying 
of this increasingly fragmented Congress has increased , so that 
every congressman can find sources of . financing for his next
campaign without party support . The number of corporations with 
Washington offices has quadrupled in the last four years . At 
the federal , as well as at the local level , politics is increasingly 
the pluralist politics of the pressure system, instead of the 
nationalizing integrating politics of party . 
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